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Jur. § 159, p. 782; Whitley v. Superior Court, 18 Cal.2d 75, 
78 [113 P.2d 449]), ameudecl the section as it presently reads. 
[5] Accordingly, the time limitation appears to be not a 
normal statute of limitations, but rather to be more in the 
nature of a qualifying condition in the exercise of any right 
to death benefits. Diligence in the presentation of the claim. 
s:l as not to be guilty of sleeping on one's rights, appar-
ently has no bc·aring if the specified time provisos are not 
satisfied. [6] Petitioner elaims that the applicatirJn of the 
statute so as to cnt off any right to death benefits before it 
accrues would be unconstitutional as a deprivation of prop-
erty without clue process of law. (U.S. Const., Fourteenth 
Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 13.) However, her right to 
recoyer death benE'fits is wholly statutory, and her constitu-
tional objection has no bearing on the issue. 
[7] It thus appears that the Legislature in plain language 
has declared the governing time limitations, as it has the right 
to do. There is no ambiguity in the present wording of the 
section, and it neither requires nor admits of interpretation. 
(Caminetti v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 22 Cal.2d 344, 353-354 
[139 P.2d 908].) Accordingly, in this case where the bar 
of the prescribed limitation period was raised, the commis-
sion properly denied relief under the provisions of section 
5406 of the Labor Code. 
The order of the Industrial Accident Commission is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Sheuk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Traynor, 
J ., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
[L. A. No. 23806. In Bank. Oct. 28, 19.'55.J 
ANTHONY ROGEHS, Respondent, v. LOS ANGELES 
TRANSIT LINES et al., Appellants. 
[1] Carriers--Pa;:;sengei's-Degree of Care Required.-The duty of 
care owed to a passenger by a common carrier includes the 
usc of the utmo:;t care and diligence for his safe carriage. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Carriers, § 42. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Carriers, § 86; [2, 5] Carriers, § 140; 
[3J Negligence, § 198(2); [4, 6] Carriers, § 147; [7] Negligence, 
§ 32; [8] Negligence, § 180; [9] Trial, § 139(3); [10] Auto-
mobiles, § 5; [11] AutOlllobiles, § 333. 
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[2] !d.-Passengers-Questions for Court and Jury.-Where a bus 
passenger was injured when his elbow, which rested on and 
protruded 2 to 4 inches beyond the window sill, was struck 
by a parked truck, and where he testified that the rear door 
of the truck, which when opened extended 4 inches beyond 
the fender, was opened just before his elbow was struck, it 
was for the jury to decide whether the bus driver should have 
anticipated that this might happen, and whether it was an 
independent intervening cause such as would break the chain 
of causation. 
[3] NGgligence- Res Ipsa Loquitur.-The doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur may be relied on to support a judgment though plain-
tiff offers no jury instruction on the subject and none is given. 
[4] Carri.ers-Passengers-Evidenca-Contributory Negligence and 
Assumption of Risk.-In a passenger's action against a bus com· 
pany for injuries sustaim"d when his elbow, which rested on 
and protruded from the bus window, struck the open rear door 
of a parked truck, the jury was not required to find that the 
passenger was contributorily negligent or that he assumed the 
risk where he testified that he had no awareness of impending 
danger before the accident happened and that he did not think 
his arm could be hit, and where he was not watching the 
traffic. 
[5] Id.- Passengers- Questions for Court and Jury.-A pas-
senger's resting of his arm on the sill of an open window of a 
motorbus does not constitute contributory negligence as a 
matter of law; it is a question for the jury. 
[6] Id.-Passengers-Evidance-Assumption of Risk.-In a pas-
senger's action against a bus company for injuries sustained 
when his elbow, which protruded from an open bus window, 
was struck by the open rear door of a parked truck, the jury 
was justified in concluding that the passenger did not have 
actual knowledge and appreciation of the danger involved so 
as to consent to the risk where the facts did not show that he 
knew of and appreciated the hazard, where he was not required 
to anticipate that the bus company and the truck owner would 
be negligent, and where he could not have assumed the risk 
unless he actually saw that the door of the truck was open 
some time before it struck his elbow and also knew that the 
bus was being driven too close to it. 
[7] Negligence-Assumption of Risk.-While a person, if fully 
informed, may assume a risk though the dangerous condition is 
[5] Extension of hand, arm or other portion of body from motor 
vehicle as contributory negligence, note, 40 A.L.R.2d 233. 
[7] See Cal.Jur., Negligence, § 79; Am.Jur., Negligence, § 171 
et seq. 
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caused by the negligence of others, he does not assume the 
risk of any negligence which he has no reason to anticipate, but 
once he is fully informed of it, the risks arising from such 
negligence may be assumed. 
[8] Id.-Instructions-Assmnption of Risk.-An offered instruc-
tion on assumption of risk is erroneous which advises the 
jury that plaintiff would assume the risk if in the exercise of 
ordinary care he would have known and apptBciated the 
danger rather than that he must have knowledge of the 
danger, and the trial court is under no duty to correct such 
instruction. 
[9]-Trial-Instruetions-Requests-Disposition.-Where the jury 
was instructed that it could consider conflicts between a 
party's deposition and his testimony at the trial in testing his 
credibility, it was not error to omit the additional direction 
that "if any statement in a party's dPposition constituted an 
admission against interest, it may be considered in determining 
the truth or falsity thereof as well as in judging his credi-
bility," since the instruction as given adequately covered the 
subject. 
[10] Automobiles-Regulation-Doors.-Veh. Code, § 596.6, refers 
to the opening of a door of a "motor vehicle," and that term 
includes trucks (Veh. Code, § 32), and the reference to loading 
and unloading passengers does not limit its application to 
passenger vehicles. 
[11] !d.-Instructions-Vehicles Standing or Parked in Streets.-
In a bus passenger's action against a truck ownpr for in 
sustained when his elbow, while resting on and protruding 
from the bus window, struck the open end of <leteJHlml, , 
parked truck, an instruction on Veh. Code, § 596.6, is proper 
where the instruction and code section merely prescribe the 
conduct of a man of ordinary prudence with respect to open-
ing doors on the traffic side of vehicles, the question of negli-
gence of the truck owner and its driver being for the jury. 
APPEAI,S from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Wallace L. Ware, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for damages for personal injuries resulting from 
an accident. Judgment for plaintiff affirmed. 
Melvin L. R. Harris, David S. Smith, Parker, Stanbury, 
Reese & McGee and William C. Wether bee for Appellants. 
F. Murray Keslar for Respondent. 
CARTER, J.-Defendants, Los Ani!eles Transit Lines, 
hereafter called Transit Lines, a common carrier of passen-
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gers by bus in Los Angeles, Peb, the driver of one of its 
buseR, Langendorf United Bakeries, hereafter called Langen-
dorf, a corporation operating trucks delivering its products, 
and Harmell, the driver of one of its trucks, appeal from 
a judgment entered on a jury verdict for damages for plain-
tiff for personal injuries alleged to have been suffered by 
plaintiff as thr result of defendants' negligence. Plaintiff's 
right arm was injured when he was resting it on the window 
ledge of Transit Lines' bus in which he was riding as a passen-
ger when it collided with the rear door of Langendorf's truck. 
Plaintiff was riding as a regular passenger on a Transit 
Lines' bus driven by Peb. He was seated on the right rear 
side of the bus beside a window. The day was warm and 
that window and others were open. The window ledge waR 
shoulder high to plaintiff, and he was resting his right arm 
on it with his elbow protruding beyond the outside of the 
ledge. The bus was being driven on Beverly Boulevard, a 
street having three lanes on each side of its center including 
the one next to the curb. Langendorf's truck was parked 
on Beverly Boulevard in the curb lane about halfway be-
tween two streets intersecting Beverly. The bus swung to 
the curb lane and made a stop. The driver proceeded ahead 
swinging the bus out toward the center lane (of the three 
lanes) and around the truck. He drove so close to the truck 
that plaintiff's elbow collided with the door on the end of 
the truck which was open and in that position extended 
beyond the side of the truck. As a result thereof plaintiff 
suffered the injuries for which he was awarded damages 
against all four defendants. 
Defendants Transit Lines and Feb contend that as a matter 
of law they were not negligent; that plaintiff was contribu-
tively negligent and had assumed the risk; and that there 
was error with respect to the jury instructions. 
[1] It is conceded by those defendants: "[T]he duty of 
care owed to a passenger by a common carrier includes the 
use of the utmost care and diligence for his safe carriage.'' 
(il1cBride v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 44 Cal.2d 113, 
116 [279 P.2d 966].) [2] In the light of that rule the 
jury could properly conclude, as it did, that the bus was 
driven too close to the parked truck for safety. The bus 
was 105 inches wide; the middle lane in which it was pro-
ceeding was 108 inches wide. While no part of the bus 
contacted any part of the truck, the proximity of the bus 
45 C.2d-14 
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to the truck was evident. Plaintiff's elbow was struck and 
it protruded only 2 to 4 inches beyond the window sill. 'rhe 
rear door of the truck when open extended 4 inches beyond 
the fender, the widest part of the truck, Plaintiff testified 
that the door on the truck was opened just before his elbow 
was struck, and it was for the jury to decide that the bus 
driver should have anticipated that might happen; that it 
was not an independent intervening cause such as would 
break the chain of causation. (See Richardson v. Ham, 44 
Cal.2d 772 [285 P.2d 269] ; Austin v. Riverside Portland 
Cement Co .. 44 Cal.2d 225 [282 P.2d 69].) There were no 
guards or bars on the bus window. It is common practice 
for a person to rest his arm on the window sill of the vehicle 
which he is driving or in which he is riding and allow his 
elbow to protrude to some extent beyond the window sill. 
[3] While it would appear that the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur is clearly appliea blc as betwePn plaintiff and Peb 
and Transit Lines, plaintiff did not invoke the doctrine either 
in the trial court or on this appeal. [t may be relied upon, 
however, to support a judgment even though plaintiff offers 
no jury instruction on the subject and none is given. (Jensen 
v. Minard, 44 Cal.2d 325 [282 P.2d 7] ; Rose v. Melody Lane, 
39 Cal.2d 481 [247 P.2d 335].) 
[ 4] It is clear that the jury was not required to find 
plaintiff was contributively negligent or that he had assumed 
the risk. In addition to the evidence above mentioned plain-
tiff testified that he had no awareness of impending danger 
before the accident happened and that he did not think his 
arm could be hit; he was not watching the traffic. 
[5] Resting the arm on the window sill such as was done 
.here does not constitute contributory negligence as a matter 
of law; it is a question for the jury. (Sec Albania v. Kovace-
vich. 44 Cal.App.2d 925 [113 P.2d 251]; Ivancich v. Davies, 
186 Cal. 520 [199 P. 7841 : Gornstein v. Priver. 64 Cal.App. 
249 [221 P. 396]; 40 A.L.R.2d 233; 157 A.L.R. 1212; 5 
hH.A.N.S. 274; Ann.Cas. 1916C, p. 1218.) While there are 
a few authorities to the contrary, the great weight of authority 
is as stated. (See authorities cited snpra.) 
[6] As to assumption of the risk the jury was justified 
in concluding that plaintiff did not have actual knowledge 
and appreciation of the danger involved so as to eonsent to 
the risk and the faets do not show that he knew of and 
appreeiated the hazard. (See Prescott v. Ralphs Grocery 
Co., 42 Cal.2d 158 [265 P.2d 904].) lie IYas not required 
Oct. 1955] RoGERS v. Los ANGELEs TRANSIT LINES 419 
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to anticipate that Transit Lines and Langendorf would be 
negligent. Plaintiff could not have assumed the risk at all 
unless he actually saw that the door of the Langendorf 
truck was open some time before it struck his elbow and 
also knew that the bus was being driven too close to it. 
[7] While a person, if fully informed, may assume the 
risk even though the dangerous condition is caused by 
the negligence of others (Prescott v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 
supra, 42 Cal.2d 158, 162), "The plaintiff does not assume 
~he risk of any negligence which he has no reason to antici-
pate, but once he is fully informed of it, it is well settled 
that the risks arising from such negligence may be assumed." 
(Prosser on Torts, p. 385.) 
[8] Transit Lines and Feb claim error in the refusal to 
give their offered instruction on assumption of risk. Suffice 
it to say the offered instruction was erroneous in that it 
advised the jury that plaintiff would assume the risk if in 
the exercise of ordinary care he would have known and 
appreciated the danger rather than that he must have knowl-
edge of the danger (see Austin v. Riverside Portland Cement 
Co., snpra, 44 Cal.2d 225; Prescott v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 
snpra, 42 Cal.2d 158). Under the last cited authorities the 
trial court was under no duty to correct the instructions. 
[9] Transit Lines and Feb also claim error in the omis-
sion from an instruction of the following statement: "If, 
prior to the trial, the deposition of a party to the action 
was taken, and if part or all of it was read into evidence, 
and if you should believe that in said deposition he made 
contradictory statement or statements in conflict with his 
testimony here in court, you may consider such conflicts, and 
any explanations given therefor, in testing his credibility, 
in like manner as if all such testimony were given originally 
at the trial. The deposition, too, was given under oath. 
Also, if any statement in a party's deposition constituted 
an admission against interest, it may be considered in deter-
mining the truth or falsity thereof as well as in Judging his 
credibility." The parts italicized were omitted and it is 
asserted that the portion with respect to admissions should 
have been left in. The instruction as given adequately covers 
the subject. 
Defendants Langendorf and Harmell contend prejudicial 
error was committe(! in the giving of the following instruction 
at plaintiff's request: "You are instructed that Section 596.6 
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of the Vehicle Code of the State of California provides as 
follows: 
"Section 596.6-0pening and Closing Vehicle Doors. 
" 'No person shall open the door of a motor vehicle on the 
side available to moving traffic unless and until it is reason-
ably safe to do so, nor shall any person leave a door open 
upon the side of a vehicle available to moving traffic for a 
period longer than necessary to load or unload passengers.' " 
(the word "passengers" was omitted although it appears in 
the code section mentioned) : that conduct in violation of 
section 596.6 is negligence per se and requires a presumption 
of negligence but it is rebuttable and "may be overcome by 
other evidence showin;~ that under all the circumstances sur-
rounding the event, the conduct in question was excusable, 
justifiable and such as might reasonably have been expected 
from a person of ordinary prudence. In this connection, you 
may assume that a person of ordinary prudence will reason-
ably endeavor to obey the law and will do so unless causes, 
not of his own intended making, induce him, without moral 
fault, to do otherwise.'' Defendants assert the section has 
no application to the rear doors of panel trucks; and that 
inasmuch as Harmell, the operator of the truck, testified that 
he had both doors open to unload merchandise and while 
the left door extended beyond the body of his truck it did 
not protrude beyond the white line of the curb lane in which 
he was parked, the jury ·would no doubt have found him 
free from negligence if properly instructed. 
[10] Section 596.6 refers to the opening of a door of a 
"motor vehicle" and that term as defined in the Vehicle 
Code includes trucks. (Veh. Code, § 32.) The reference to 
loading and unloading passengers does not limit its applica-
tion to passenger vehicles. There is no provision bearing 
upon a door left open to unload merchandise and in that 
respect the instruction was more favorable to defendants 
than required by the section. [11] The instruction and 
section do nothing more than prescribe the conduct of a man 
of ordinary prudence with respect to opening doors on the 
traffic side of vehicles. (West v. Hot<se, 99 Cal.App.2d 643 
[222 P.2d 269].) We hold, therefore, that the instruction 
was proper; the question of defendants' negligence was for 
the jury. (West v. House. supra, 99 Cal.App.2d 643.) 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J ., Shenk, J ., Traynor, J ., Schauer, J ., and 
Spence, J ., concurred. 
